

ies. All these remarkable achievements contributed to an elevation of the cultural and educational level of the citizenry. A spinoff of this government-sponsored gigantic undertaking was the emergence of a large number of gifted and skilled professional and amateur authors and literary and art groups.

On the other hand, the dominant official ideology of *Juche* interfered with literature and art in a very serious way and with devastating consequences. Under the Kim regime, literature and art became an instrument for implementing Party policy, for strengthening the totalitarian regime, and for promoting Kim Il Sung's personality cult. The only period of respite from such rigorous ideological domination was the 1950s.

Deplorably, the rigid and unrelenting central control over literature and art virtually stifled creative activities and thwarted genuine artistic endeavors and deterred fruitful and free debate. From the dominance of the *Juche* idea ensured through heavy censorship and other administrative measures arose insuperable difficulties in the free pursuit of literature and art. Diversity and pluralism in art were completely eliminated. Both the outside world and history were examined and analyzed strictly within the ideological parameters of *Juche*. *Juche* has been the sole legitimate world outlook and political philosophy. Only one approach—socialist realism in its extreme form—received official approval. It was devoted first to the adulation of the Kim dynasty and then to the glorification of the Party for its leading role in society.

As for contemporary South Korean literature and art, the North Korean people were kept in total ignorance about them and allowed absolutely no access to them. All they could have was misinformation provided by the Pyongyang purveyors of lies. The situation was further exacerbated by its isolation not only from South Korea but also from the rest of the world. Minimal interaction with writers, artists, and scientists abroad results in an insular mentality and parochialism and makes it difficult for its people to comprehend problems related not only to the rest of the world but also to Korea itself. Given the obduracy of the Kim Il Sung regime, the transformation of the deeply ingrained system is a long-term process. North Korea's literature and art will still stagnate, much like the process of reunification.

# 5

## IDEOLOGY AND WOMEN IN NORTH KOREA

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Studies on the position of women in society have shown considerable disagreement regarding the type of social system that may be conducive to the emancipation of women. The Western liberal modernization perspective expects that the process of industrialization will remove traditional constraints on women, change the traditional pattern of sexual division, and thereby foster the liberation of women. Women are supposed to be one of the most favored beneficiaries of the fruits of modernization. The subordination or marginalization of women in capitalist society is regarded as a "deviation" from the Western social norms of equality, freedom, and justice. It results from the fact that fruits of modernization have benefited primarily men as only men were working in the public sphere while women were confined to the domestic sphere. Yet, the problem of sexual inequality can be corrected within the capitalist system through technical reforms such as legal and attitudinal changes. It is assumed that women can be liberated by being well integrated into the public sphere of the capitalist structures and into the process of modernization.

The Marxist perspective, on the other hand, sees the roots of sexual inequality, like other forms of social inequality including class hierarchy, lying in private property. Private property required the family institution in order to preserve wealth through inheritance within the paternal line. In the bourgeois family, woman became the property of her husband, whose responsibilities included unpaid domestic production and reproduction. Hence, according to this perspective, wives are proletariats exploited by their bourgeois husbands. Accordingly, oppression of women is a structural problem that cannot be solved within the capitalist structure. The subordination of women can only be solved by a socialist revolution of class struggle, which will eventually free women from unpaid domestic labor, and integrate them into social production.

North Korea has closely adhered to the Marxist perspective on the "woman question." Today, it claims that North Korean women have already achieved a liberation in the country of a women's paradise. Although there has been a remarkable improvement in the women's position after the establishment of the socialist regime in North Korea, this extreme optimism seems to have some loopholes. This paper attempts to examine North Korea's policies on the "woman question" and the status of women in order to analyze how the socialist system has contributed to improving the women's lot in that political system.

As North Korea is an extremely closed system, a dearth of data and information severely limits any study on that country. Up to the present, a very limited number of studies touched the subject of women, most of which are short accounts of fact-finding trips to North Korea. As one scholar notices, information on North Korean women is "conspicuous by its absence in most studies on women in post-revolutionary societies."<sup>1</sup> The present study is mainly based on North Korean sources including a woman's magazine, speeches of President Kim Il Sung, newspapers, and other government publications. But, in an effort to balance the reliability of these materials, South Korean government sources were also consulted.

## MAJOR POLICIES ON WOMEN

Since the Communist revolution aimed at changing the traditional social structure and liberating the oppressed under the traditional society, such as women and peasants, the North Korean leaders incorporated this task into the regime formation process. Since as early as 1946, North Korea has instituted various policies regarding women's emancipation. These policies seem to aim at three basic goals: liberation of women from the patriarchal family and social systems; liberation through social labor; and creation of a socialist woman.

### Liberation from the Patriarchal Family and Social Systems

Immediately following liberation from Japanese colonialism, the North Korean leaders launched a series of campaigns and reforms, including family and land reforms and nationalization of all enterprises that had been owned by Japanese capitalists or Korean collaborators, as an integral part of the socialist regime formation effort. Concurrently, various laws for social change were promulgated by the Provisional People's Committee, such as the Law on Land Reform, the Law on Sex Equality, the Labor Law, and the Law on Nationalization of Essential Industries.

In March 1946, an agrarian reform was instituted with some one million *chongbo* of land confiscated for redistribution gratis among about 724,000 poor and landless peasants. It granted women equal allotments of land as Kim Il Sung mentioned: "At the time of the agrarian reform women in the countryside received their share of land on a par with men and became the owners of lands like all the rest of the peasants."<sup>2</sup> The most progressive law that brought a sweeping change to the traditional position of women was the Law on Sex Equality announced on July 30, 1946. The purpose of the

Law was to "transform the old feudal relations of the sexes" and to encourage women to "participate fully in cultural, social, and political life." It emphasized equal rights in all spheres of State, the right to a free marriage and divorce, and equal rights to inherit property and to share property in case of divorce. It ended arranged marriages, polygamy, concubinage, buying and selling of women, prostitution, and the professional entertainer system. Thus, for the first time in history, women were placed on an equal footing with men in all areas. The Labor Law was also an important legislation with regard to women's rights at work. In Articles 14 through 17, it stipulates the rights of mothers and pregnant women, including seventy-seven days of maternity leave with full pay, baby-feeding break during work with pay, prohibition of assigning pregnant or nursing women on overtime or night work, and transferring of a pregnant woman to easier work with equal pay. In addition, the Law on Nationalization of Essential Industries, which was the beginning of an elimination of private property, contributed to a weakening of the economic power of a patriarch.

Along with these laws, North Korea abolished the family registry system based on male lineage in 1947, replacing it with the new citizen registry system. Considering that South Korean women's organizations have failed, up to present, to abolish the system in spite of their arduous struggle against it for almost three decades, leaders of North Korea appear to have had a strong commitment to the abolition of the feudal family system. At the same time, in 1946, the mass organization for women, the Democratic Women's Union of North Korea, was established to unite the women's movement under the Korean Workers' Party (KWP).

These sweeping changes brought a profound impact on the traditional patriarchal systems, especially on the family system: Kinship clans eventually disappeared, the family lineage-book system was completely destroyed, and thus, the nuclear family system began to emerge. Without doubt, these policies announced as early as 1946 and 1947 laid a basis for the emancipation of women from the feudalistic patriarchy of the family and social systems. These legal guarantees were reinforced later by the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of 1949, the Socialist Constitution of 1972, and other statutes of North Korea.

However, the legal granting of equal rights was not enough to liberate women from patriarchy. These rights were given to women from above almost overnight. In view of the authoritarian culture of the nation, the concept of "equality" was alien to both men and women, and it soon received tremendous resistance. On the eve of the historic first democratic election, men openly opposed women's right to vote and the election of women candidates on the People's Committee, mobilizing every means including abstentions to prevent them from being elected. Kim Il Sung soon felt the immediate need for awakening and educating the people to his equal rights campaign. He delivered numerous speeches, stepped up the educa-

tion of the women through the organizational enlargement of the Women's Union, and launched an extensive campaign to wipe out illiteracy among the women to awaken them to their rights. On the occasion of the democratic elections, he pointed out:

Still others maintain that women should not be elected to the people's committees and even that they should not be allowed to take part in the elections. This is also wrong thinking. Women account for half of the population. If half of the people do not take part in electing the organ of power or in its work, such power can hardly be called a genuine people's power. Women constitute a great force, and large numbers of them are sharing in the work of rehabilitating our country no less creditably than men. In our country women are guaranteed by law equal rights with men in all fields. The Law on Sex Equality, therefore, should be fully enforced in the elections, for only then can they be truly democratic elections.<sup>3</sup>

As such, emancipation of women from the patriarchal family and social systems was one of the basic goals of North Korea's policy on the "woman question."

### Liberation through Social Labor

In the tradition of classical Marxist theory, particularly in the theory of Friedrich Engels, sexual equality will result from economic liberation, and women's participation in economic production outside the home will lead to their full emancipation. Engels argues: "The first requisite for the emancipation of women is that all women participate again in social labor; to achieve this, individual families are required to be no longer the units of the social economy."<sup>4</sup> Kim Il Sung embraced this idea when he said: "The women. . . can achieve complete emancipation only if they strive with no less devotion and awareness than men to solve the problems arising on the productive fronts of the factories and countryside. . ."<sup>5</sup> Based on this basic tenet of Marxist theory, North Korea initiated "working-classization" of women, which was to enhance their economic independence.

It was not until the late 1950s when North Korea embarked on a program to instill in the populace the socialist values, norms, and ideals. In fact, Kim Il Sung himself admitted in 1955 that the party did not propagandize very actively for socialism prior to this period:

If we had advocated building socialism in Korea immediately after the liberation, who would have listened to us? People would never

have come near us, because the Japanese imperialists had conducted malignant propaganda, even alleging that under socialism many share one bed and eat meals from one common pot.<sup>6</sup>

In order for a socialist construction, North Korea initiated the mass mobilization campaign, the *Chollima* (Flying Horse) movement. It aimed at reaching a "revolutionary high tide of socialist construction" and realizing industrialization through the mobilization of the masses. With this mass mobilization campaign, the focus of women's policy shifted from achieving equality and liberation from traditional oppression to Engels' "liberation through labor." The purpose was to inject socialist ideas that women's emancipation would be achieved only through loyalty to the regime's task of building a socialist Korea. Accordingly, it was claimed that women had already achieved liberation since the groundwork for equality had been laid in the law, and thus, they now should turn their energies into productive work to help build socialist Korea. Kim Il Sung made this point clear in his speech:

An important question in Women's Union activities in the past was to wipe out illiteracy and eliminate the feudalistic ideas that oppressed the women. But this work no longer seems to be of major importance in our society. Today, the Women's Union should actively campaign for women's participation in socialist construction and bend its efforts to provide conditions that will allow them to work well.<sup>7</sup>

As such, women were encouraged to play a role "as one wheel of a wagon in the work of nation-building."

In order to mobilize women outside the family the regime pushed for socialization of housework. According to Lenin, although participation in labor is a necessary condition of female emancipation, the real emancipation will begin "only where and when an all-out struggle begins against this petty housekeeping. . ."<sup>8</sup> Engels is in accord with Lenin when he said that true equality comes only when "private housekeeping is transformed into a social industry, [and] the care and education of children becomes a public affair."<sup>9</sup> In North Korea, as early as 1946, Kim Il Sung pointed out that the state should take steps to bring up the children under public care in order to encourage women to take part in public life.<sup>10</sup> Later, the Fifth Congress of the WPK in 1970 announced freeing women from the heavy burden to household as one of the major goals of the party, which was reflected later in article 62 of the Socialist Constitution of 1972. The article stipulates some benefits of women in order to provide every possible condition for them to participate in public life, including maternity leave with pay, maternity

hospitals, free nurseries and kindergartens, and reduced working hours for mothers of large families. At the same time, the Law on the Nursing and Upbringing of Children of 1976, and the Socialist Labor Law of 1978 stipulated a progressive provision that women with three or more children under 13 receive eight-hours pay for six-hours work. Through these measures, the point was made clear that it was the responsibility of the state and society to bring up children and to protect working mothers.

With the launching of the *Chollima* movement, North Korean women's housework began to be socialized through nurseries, kindergartens, laundries, and an efficient food industry. In 1949, North Korea started with only 12 nurseries and 116 kindergartens, which increased to 7600 and 4500, respectively, in 1961, admitting 700,000 children. It was reported in 1976 that almost 100 percent of the 3.5 million children could enter more than 60,000 nurseries and kindergartens.<sup>11</sup> In addition, there is reportedly an extensive network of food "take out" services for busy working women. One Women's Union member summarizes the socialization of housework in North Korea:

Children are brought up at state expense. If there is pressing and ironing [to be done] it goes to the laundries. The foodstuffs industry has been developed, so food can be bought at any time. So what is there left to do in the family?<sup>12</sup>

At the same time, women were urged to participate vigorously in the technical revolution by acquiring at least one technique in order to free themselves from their arduous labor. The technical revolution is one of the programs of the "triple revolution" of technology, culture, and ideology, which begun under the slogan, "Let's meet the requirement of *Juche* (self-reliance) in ideology, technology, and culture."<sup>13</sup> It is regarded as the prerequisite for successful construction of socialism via the *Chollima* movement.

All these measures and the *Chollima* mass mobilization campaign greatly expanded women's participation in the labor force. The female labor force, which was only 20 percent in 1956, has steadily increased, and women now constitute about 48 percent of the total labor force. The 1980 data showed that women occupied 56 percent of the labor force in the agricultural sector, 45 percent in the industrial sector, 20 percent in mining, 30 percent in forestry, 15 percent in heavy industry, and 70 percent in light industry.<sup>14</sup> In the educational area, women accounted for 80 percent of the elementary school teachers, while the figures for the middle and high school, technical school, and college levels were 35 percent, 30 percent, and 15 percent, respectively. Women are playing a particularly prominent part in agriculture, light industry, and education.

At the same time, women's participation in public and political affairs was also encouraged. In 1961, Kim Il Sung emphasized that there

should be many women with master's degrees and with doctorates, pointing out that no woman had yet received a doctorate. He also pointed out that there was a very small number of women cadres, in view of women's making up half the population of the country, and that even those women cadres were in the areas of secondary importance.<sup>15</sup> By 1972, women accounted for more than 20 percent of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) (see Table 1), and at the local levels of people's assemblies in provinces, cities, and counties, women have occupied between 20 and 26 percent since 1956. It was also reported in 1976 that a third of all deputies to representative government organizations, ranging from the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) to local people's assemblies, were women.<sup>16</sup>

In the early 1950s, the North Korean leadership, which had been fairly tolerant of private enterprise, began to accelerate the process of nationalizing the remaining private industry as well as trade and transportation, and collectivizing agriculture through cooperatives. This goal, the socialist transformation of ownership of the production means, became reality by the end of the 1950s. As Engels argued, efforts were made to replace individual families with collectives as the units of the social economy. The total collectivization of agriculture and industry, which was accompanied by the *Chollima* movement, greatly contributed to the weakening of the patriarchal power. Elimination of private property led to the demolition of inheritance, which destroyed the material basis of traditional patriarchy. At the same time, the collectivization efforts accelerated the mobilization of women outside the family for their productive labor. In sum, women were encouraged to take more economic, social, and political roles for socialist construction. They could acquire economic independence through paid labor,

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY (SPA) MEMBERS

SPA	Date	%
First	August 1948	12.1
Second	August 1957	12.6
Third	October 1962	9.1
Fourth	November 1967	16.0
Fifth	December 1972	21.0
Sixth	December 1977	20.8
Seventh	February 1982	NA
Eighth	December 1986	21.1
Ninth	May 1990	NA

SOURCES: The First through the Sixth: Dae-Sook Suh, *Korean Communism: 1945-1980* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1981), p. 442. The Eighth: *Choson Yosong*, April 1989, p. 29.

became socially active, and held responsible positions. They were provided with non-traditional new roles.

### Creation of a Socialist Woman

Another goal of North Korea's women's policy is to create a socialist woman. Since the early 1960s, this goal has been pursued along with the cultural and ideological revolutions of the "triple revolution." The cultural revolution was meant to dispose of remnants of traditional ideas and political culture of Confucianism, and replace them with a new socialist culture. In order to bring about new socialist culture, intellectualization of the whole society through education was an important goal to be achieved: "To intellectualize the whole society means training all members of society following their working classization, to be fully developed communist-type men with the cultural and technical standards of the university graduate."<sup>17</sup> A new eleven-year compulsory educational program got under way to produce fully developed men and women of the *Juche* type, and the whole country was required to study under the revolutionary slogan, "Let the entire Party, the entire people and the entire army study!" It was claimed that all the working people, without exception, were enrolled in the study networks of Party and working people's organizations and the system of adult education. Closely related to the cultural revolution are the regime's efforts to remold people through political indoctrination. Close attention was paid to the ideological education of the masses, so as to arouse enthusiasm of the masses, and to model the society on the *Juche* idea. Through all these measures, North Korea attempted to increase the political consciousness of the masses so that they work selflessly for collective objectives, which the new socialist men and women should embrace.

The women's task here is to revolutionize and work-classizing themselves first before undertaking the role of upbringing their children. The Fourth Congress of the Party in 1961 proposed as its important function the task of educating and rearing children along communist lines. Mothers were charged with this "honorable revolutionary duty" as first the educator of children, and were urged to become excellent communists to assume the duty. Kim Il Sung singled out as an important responsibility of the Women's Union the task of "making all women communist mothers and fine communist educators for the new generation. . ."<sup>18</sup> He added that in order to become a communist mother, she should participate in public life because it would help her keep abreast of realities and quickly acquire communist ideology. Along this line, the Chairwoman of the Women's Union Kim Song Ae (Kim Il Sung's wife) announced that the basic task of the organization is to correct the tendency to perceive the organization as a culturally enlightening group, and to educate and indoctrinate women with communist ideology. In order to achieve this task, the Union formed nation-wide study groups named the

"Mother Kang Ban Suk Study Groups" to allow women to "Learn from Mother Kang Ban Suk" and from other women members of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army. It also reorganized the adult education system, "Mothers' School," and shifted its emphasis from the enlightenment of women to ideological education. In addition, in 1961, "Mothers' Exhibition Gallery" was open to educate women through showing them the achievements of communist mothers and communist women. Very recently, this task of the Union was reaffirmed during the tenth plenary meeting of the Central Committee, held in May 1990. All women, including mothers and nurses at the day-care centers were urged to become "true communists" equipped with the *Juche* idea so that they can assume the role of communist mothers and teachers to raise children as socialist revolutionaries.

### Prospects

As examined above, North Korean women experienced radical changes after the socialist revolution. The leaders were committed to change the traditional family, economic, and social systems, which brought the North Korean women various legal and institutional arrangements for equal rights. As mentioned earlier, these rights were given to them almost overnight from above. Throughout the post-revolutionary period, opportunities for women in public life have been greatly expanded through many affirmative measures such as the quota system in various political positions. Furthermore, women's status in a family has largely been enhanced as a result of gaining economic power through work. Thus, North Korea's legal provisions and institutional mechanisms for improving women's lot in the society appear to be impressive, especially when they are compared with other developing countries.

Nevertheless, North Korean women cannot be said to have achieved the level of socioeconomic status as admirable as claimed by the North Koreans themselves. In his theory of social inequality, Gerhard Lenski identifies a set of three sources of power influencing inequality in society as the "power of property" (economic power), the "power of position," and the "power of force."<sup>19</sup> As alluded to earlier, the most remarkable improvement for the North Korean women was made in the economic arena due to the regime's emphasis on liberation through labor and to the abolition of private property that led to the decline of economic power of the patriarch. However, it is evident that male and female wages are not equal in North Korea, although no specific information is available concerning a pay scale.<sup>20</sup> The wage difference can be attributed to the unequal representation of women in various occupational structures, indicating a sexual division of labor. As shown earlier, women are well represented in such areas as light industry, agriculture, public health, and education. However, sexual parity is

obvious in the several male-dominant arenas, including heavy industry, mining, and high technology. This suggests that the North Korean women do not seem to share the "power of property" completely, although they have shown a major advance in this area.

Women do not seem to have achieved the "power of position" in North Korea. Although women occupy about one-third of the representative positions in the lower echelons of power, they are greatly underrepresented in the upper levels of power structure, perhaps with the exception of the SPA which is not considered the real decision-making center (see Table 1). As one examines the more powerful organizations such as the Central Committee (CC), the Politburo of the KWP, and the Administrative Council (the Cabinet), it becomes apparent that very few women have been in positions of power. As shown in Table 2, the proportion of women members in the CC has fluctuated between 2.4 percent to 5.1 percent for full members, and 4.9

TABLE 2  
FEMALE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Congress	Date	Full Members	%	Candidate Members	%
First	August 1946	Ho Chong Suka Pak Chong Aea	4.7	—	—
Second	March 1948	Pak Chong Ae Ho Chong Suk	3.0	—	—
Third	April 1956	Pak Chong Ae Ho Chong Suk	2.8	—	—
Fourth	September 1961	Pak Chong Ae Kim Ok Sun	2.4	Yi Yang Sukb Hwang Sun Hui Pak Hyong Suk Yi Yong Sun Han Kyong Suk	10.0
Fifth	November 1961	Chong Kyong Hui <sup>a</sup> Hwang Sun Hui <sup>a</sup> O Suk Hui Yi Son Hwa Yu Sun Hui Chon Yong Hui	5.1	Ho Chang Sukb Wang Ok Hwanb Kim Kum Ok Ho Yon Suk Chon Yong Hui	7.3
Sixth	October 1980	Chong Kyong Hui Ho Chong Suk Hwang Sun Hui Kim Song Ae Yu Chong Suk	3.4	Yi Yang Suk Yun Ki Jong Ho Chang Suk Wang Ok Hwan Pak Sol Hui	4.9

a. Reelected to full membership.

b. Reelected to candidate membership.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from Dae-Sook Suh, *Korean Communism: 1945-1980* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1981).

percent to 10 percent for candidate members. Up to the Sixth Party Congress, only eleven different women have served the CC as full members, among whom four were reelected. In the highest decision-making body of the KWP, the Politburo (Political Committee), only Pak Chong Ae has served, in the Fourth Congress, as a member. Chong Kyong Hui was appointed alternate member of the Politburo in the Sixth Congress, and was later joined by Kim Bok Shin. Thus far, only three women could climb to the highest level of the power structure. In the Administrative Council, women have filled only two positions on the average in each cabinet (see Table 3). Currently, Kim Bok Sin serves as deputy premier of the Administrative Council.

This manifest low representation in the ruling bodies is exacerbated by women's low representation in the military. Women's participation in the military, which has been one of the most significant sources of power and leadership in the KWP,<sup>21</sup> especially during the early years of the regime formation, has virtually been insignificant. When asked what was the highest rank held by a woman in the military, a representative of the Women's Union did not know except that some women held the rank of Colonel as heads of military hospitals.<sup>21</sup> This suggests that there is no prominent female figure in the armed forces. During the revolutionary period, there were independence heroines and fighters, but they never gained control of the means of coercion. North Korean women do not seem to share the "power of force."

In short, it seems that women showed a major advance in obtaining part of the "power of property," yet, the "power of position" and the "power of force" have been monopolized by men. A handful of women played a part in the political leadership hierarchy. However, since women were not organized as *women*, this lack of power bloc resulted, to use Salaff and Merkle's term, in the "star system." Individual women are promoted as "symbols of the fulfillment of revolutionary promises rather than a substantial commitment to end the oppression of women as a category."<sup>23</sup>

In North Korea, the problem of organizing women as *women* is largely based on the basic tenet of Marxist theory that women would not be fully liberated until communism came into a full swing. As the "woman question" should be subsumed under the "class question," a communist revolution is needed to free women. Therefore, any attempt to organize the masses around women's issues is seen as selfish and divisive to class solidarity. In fact, those who confine themselves to the "woman question" are considered bourgeois women, and it is maintained that women should pursue the equality of men and women together rather than focusing on their status as women. Kim Il Sung once made this point clear by labeling a women's organization that claims emancipation "apart from economic and productive activities and all other social activities" as a "rich women's club."<sup>24</sup> Accordingly, feminism, which places women's concerns first, is evil and counterrevolutionary. Many leftist women as well as men would oppose

TABLE 3  
SOME FEMALE MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

Cabinet	Appointment	Ministry	Name	Tenure
First:	1948	Minister of Culture and Propaganda	Ho Chong Suk	9 years
	1957	Minister of Justice	Ho Chong Suk	1 month
	1957	Minister of Justice	Ho Chong Suk	2 years
Second	1961	Minister of Agriculture	Pak Chong Ae	1 year
	1962	Minister of Commerce	Yi Yang Suk	1 month
Third	1966	Minister of Culture	Pak Yong Sin	1 year
	1967	Minister of Foodstuff and Daily Necessities Industries	Yi Ho Hyok	1 year
	1967	Minister of Textile and Paper Industries	Yi Yang Suk	1 year
Fourth	1967	Minister of Foodstuff and Daily Necessities Industries	Yi Ho Hyok	5 years
	1967	Minister of Culture	Pak Yong Sin	5 years
Fifth	1972	Minister of Textile and Paper Industries	Yi Yang Suk	5 years
	NA	None	Yun Gi Jong	NA
	1982	Minister of Finance	Yun Gi Jong	NA
Seventh	1986	Chair of External Economic Commission	Kim Bok Sin	NA
	1986	Minister of Finance	Yun Gi Jong	NA
Ninth	1990	Chair of the Light Industry Commission	Kim Bok Sin	present
	1990	Minister of Finance	Yun Gi Jong	present

First-Sixth: Both original and interim appointees.

Seventh-Ninth: Only original appointees.

SOURCE: Compiled by the author from various sources.

feminism as being too selfish and bourgeois, and view women's problems as peripheral to the proletarian struggle. This ideological tenet discouraged the women's movement in North Korea, and it may help explain why the campaign to liberate women from traditional oppression has been left to the KWP and that its goals and strategies have been defined by the men who dominate the KWP.

In sum, although the position of women in North Korea has been much improved from that of pre-revolutionary days, especially in the economic arena, women still lack the powers of position and force. North Korea's adherence to the Marxist perspective that undermine feminists' struggle for liberation, coupled with the tradition of male superiority of Neo-Confucianism that is still very much alive in the people's belief system, seems to be a major hurdle to overcome.

## NOTES

1. An earlier and extended version of this chapter was published in *Pacific Affairs* (Vol. 65, No. 4, Winter 1992-93, pp. 527-545). Jon Halliday, "Women in North Korea: An Interview with the Korean Democratic Women's Union," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 17 (3), 1985, p. 50.
2. Kim Il Sung addressed the Communist Worker's of Women's Union, who were scheduled to attend First Conference of Democratic Women's Union of North Korea. See his speech, "On the Future Tasks of the Women's Union," May 9, 1946, *Kim Il Sung Works*, Vol. 2 (Pyongyang: F.L.P.H., 1980), p. 185.
3. "On the Eve of the Historic Democratic Elections," speech at a Pyongyang Celebration of the Democratic Elections, November 1, 1946, *Kim Il Sung Works*, p. 463.
4. Quoted in Phyllis Andors, "Social Revolution and Woman's Emancipation: China During the Great Leap Forward," *Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 7, January-March 1969, p. 35.
5. Kim Il Sung's speech "Congratulations on the Founding of the Magazine, *Korean Women*." See *Kim Il Sung Works*, September 6, 1946, p. 354.
6. "Some Questions Concerning Party and State Work," April 14, 1955, *Kim Il Sung Selected Works* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1976), Vol. I, p. 291.
7. "The Duty of Mothers in the Education of Children," speech at the National Meeting of Mothers, November 16, 1961, *Kim Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 227.
8. V. Lenin, "A Great Beginning," in *The Emancipation of Women: Selections From the Writings of V.I. Lenin* (New York: International Publishers, 1966), pp. 63-64, quoted in Phyllis Andors, "A Look at the Present Socio-Economic and Political Context of the Changing Role of Women and the Family in China," *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, 12(1), 1976, p. 23.
9. Quoted in Jane Jaquette, "Women and Modernization Theory: A Decade of Feminist Criticism," *World Politics*, 34(2), 1982, p. 274.
10. "On the Future Tasks," p. 194.
11. Kim Il Sung, "On Further Developing the Nursing and Upbringing of Children," speech delivered at the sixth session of the Fifth Supreme People's Assembly, April 29, 1976.
12. Halliday, p. 53.
13. For a detailed discussion of the triple revolution and *Juche* ideology, see Kyung Ae Park and Han S. Park, *China and North Korea: Politics of Integration and Modernization* (Hong Kong: Asian Research Service, 1990), Chapter III.

14. Tae Young Lee, *Bukhan Yosong* [North Korean Women] (Seoul, Korea: Silchon Moonhak Sa, 1988), p. 194.
15. "On Revolutionizing and 'Working-Classizing' Women," speech at the fourth congress of the Democratic Women's Union of Korea, October 7, 1971, *Kim Selected Works*, Vol. VI, pp. 105-126.
16. *Rodong sinmun*, July 3, 1976.
17. Muhammad Missouri, *Kimilsungism* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1978), p. 228.
18. "The Duty of Mothers," p. 225.
19. Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966).
20. Halliday, p. 48.
21. Military representation in the CC has fluctuated between 12 and 20 percent: 12 in the Second Congress; 13 in the Third; 20 in the Fourth; 16 in the Fifth; and 17 in the Sixth Congress. See Kyung Ae Park, "A Comparison of Political Involvement of the Military in China and North Korea," paper delivered at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., March 5-9, 1985.
22. Halliday, p. 54.
23. Janet Salaff and Judith Merkel, "Women in Revolution: The Lessons of the Soviet Union and China," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 15 (1970), p. 182.
24. "On Founding of the Magazine," p. 354.